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Résumé: Nous considérons un dupole dans lequel les valuations des consommateurs pour les qualités 
des produits offerts par les firms sont hétérogènes. Les firmes sont informées 
asymétriquement sur les valuations des consommateurs: chaque firme connaît les goûts des 
consommateurs pour son produit mais est non informée sur les goûts pour le produit offert par 
sa rivale. Dans ce contexte, nous étudions différents types d'équilibres suivant les restrictions 
imposées sur les outils de tarification à la disposition des firmes. 
 
Abstract: We analyze a duopoly model in which consumers' values for the qualities of the firms 
products are heterogenous. Firms are asymmetrically informed about the consumers' taste 
parameters: while each firm knows the consumers' tastes for its own brand, it is uninformed 
about the taste for the rival brand. Competition under this type of asymmetry yields new 
features, namely upward distortions with respect to the first-best, and consumers' rent which is 
decreasing in their valuations. We also show that both firms are better off by pricing 
uniformly rather than screening along the unknown dimension of the consumer's 
characteristics. Finally, our model predicts qualitatively different equilibrium outcomes 
depending on whether consumers have the possibility to shop exclusively with one of the 
firms (delegated common agency) or not (intrinsic common agency). 
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1 Introduction
The literature on nonlinear pricing (or second degree price discrimination) in oligopolistic
environments has mainly analyzed settings in which consumers are characterized by one
dimension of heterogeneity. In a recent paper, Rochet and Stole (2003, first paragraph
of the introduction) argue that “a minimally accurate model of imperfect competition
between duopolists suggests including two dimensions of heterogeneity -vertical and hor-
izontal.” Indeed, any empirical estimation of a nonlinear price competition is likely to
require describing the consumers as having different tastes for the various products they
are offered.
Following early attempts in the eighties, models with two dimensions of heterogeneity
are receiving increasing attention.1 The existing works always assume that competing
firms are symmetrically uninformed about the consumers’ privately observed characteris-
tics. However, in many situations, it is not difficult to believe that each of the competing
firms may have an informational advantage over its rivals on some subsets of the consumers’
information set that directly relates to this firm.2 For instance, when firms compete over
many periods, it becomes likely that a firm may be better informed than its rivals about the
consumer’s taste for its own brand.3 Moreover, as documented by Liu and Serfes (2003),
firms can acquire information in two ways: directly, by repeated interaction (transaction
or after-sale), telemarketing or direct mail survey, or indirectly, by credit cards reports, or
a marketing firm; while indirect information is available to all competitors, direct infor-
mation can be obtained only by the concerned firm, which implies that a firm may better
be informed than its competitors about consumers’ preferences for its own product. How
does this asymmetric informational (dis)advantage affect competition? Does it benefit or
does it harm firms?
To answer these questions, we develop a model of duopolistic competition under infor-
mation asymmetry in which consumers are characterized by two dimensions of heterogene-
ity: their distinct tastes for two (imperfectly substitutable) goods, each good being offered
by one firm only.4 We assume that, while each firm perfectly knows the consumers’ taste
for its own brand, it remains uninformed about the taste for the rival’s brand. Hence, in
our model, there is an information asymmetry not only between consumers and firms, but
also between firms themselves. Strikingly enough, the equilibria that we derive exhibit
interesting new features, that is, upward distortions –in the products attributes– with re-
spect to the first-best, rents that may be decreasing in the consumers’ valuation for one of
the brands, and strong qualitative differences between the situation in which consumers
must buy both goods or none and the case in which they can shop exclusively with one
1See Borenstein (1985), Spulber (1989), Borenstein and Rose (1994), Champsaur and Rochet (1989),
Ivaldi and Martimort (1994), Stole (1995), Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999), Armstrong and Vickers
(2001), and Rochet and Stole (2002, 2003) among others.
2In a paper that performs an empirical test of nonlinear pricing in the US cellular industry, Miravette and
Ro¨ller (2003, p.20) allow a possible asymmetry (between firms) in the distribution of the consumer’s taste
parameters. This asymmetry, which they coined “as an important departure from Ivaldi and Martimort
(1994)”, “perhaps reflects a better knowledge [from one of the firms] of the communication behavior of
customers in such market.”
3Over time, a firm can see how consumers react to changes in its price or to the different qualities it
offers. From the observation of its own demand, firms prices and total sales in the industry, a firm can
learn about consumer’s taste for its own products.
4In a sense, there is both horizontal and vertical differentiation.
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firm.
We also compare two pricing policies, basically screening vs. uniform pricing along
the unknown dimension. Under fully discriminating pricing (FDP), each firm screens (via
nonlinear pricing) the consumers along the unknown dimension of heterogeneity. Hence,
given that each firm is informed about one dimension of the consumer’s characteristics, the
FDP consists in a mix of perfect discrimination along the known dimension and second-
degree price discrimination along the unknown dimension. By contrast, under partially
discriminating pricing (PDP), firms practice a mix of perfect discrimination along the
known dimension, and uniform pricing along the unknown dimension. We show that,
in terms of firms’ profit, PDP dominates FDP. In other words, when each firm has an
informational advantage over its rival, then it is better off not trying to screen the consumer
along the (unknown) dimension that the rival firm is informed about. In a nutshell,
strategic ignorance of a consumer’s taste for the rival’s brand softens competition.
The recent developments in common agency theory have made it an attractive tool
to analyze competition between firms sharing common consumers.5 Within this theory,
one has to distinguish between intrinsic common agency and delegated common agency.
Under the first setting, firms make simultaneously their offers, and the consumer must
either accept both offers or none of the offers. While this setting is more realistic in vertical
relations between producers and distributors6, it can also apply to market competition with
substitute goods. Indeed, consider the following example by Martimort and Stole (2003b):
software and CPU are complements in the sense that one is worth nothing without the
other. Hence a user will acquire both of them or none. However, they are also substitutes
in that, more CPU can compensate for low quality software and vice versa; this setting
correspond exactly to the case of intrinsic common agency with substitute goods.7 Under
delegated common agency, the consumer may refuse one of the firms’ offers, or even both.
Hence, this latter setting appears to be more descriptive of market competition in general.
In our paper, we nevertheless conduct the analysis under both delegated and intrinsic
common agency.
In our framework, each firm knows the information that its rival doesn’t know. It
implies that a firm’s preferences over the consumer’s type is strongly affected by the
price offered by the rival firm. Using the terminology of Miravette and Ro¨ller (2003),
the consumer’s “effective type” becomes endogenous. Given that a firm’s ranking of the
consumer’s unknown type depends on the equilibrium price of the rival firm (which knows
that type), we obtain some strategic effects that, to the best of our knowledge, are new
in this literature. As a result, quality/quantity distortions, as well as the variation of
a consumer’s rent with respect to his type may go in opposite direction than one would
expect.
While under delegated common agency (where the equilibrium is unique) a firm’s
5See Bernheim and Winsthon (1986), Stole (1991), Martimort (1992), Martimort and Stole (2003a,
2003b) among others.
6Assume that there are two main brands competing. Typically, a supermarket will want to distribute
both brands instead of one only, otherwise it may loose the consumers who like the missing brand. Hence
the decision is about opening a supermarket (and distributing both brands), or not.
7Even in the case of producer-distributor relationship, the distributor’s tastes for each brand is likely
to reflect those of the consumers that it will ultimately serve. A supermarket will not acquire too many
units of, say brand A, if its customers prefer brand B.
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equilibrium ranking of the consumer’s types is standard (that is, consumers with higher
valuation for a given brand get higher rents), the equilibrium distortions in quality are
not standard. With respect to the first-best (where both –non cooperating– firms are
fully informed about both dimensions), oversupply of quality may occur, hence a socially
wasteful allocation. The intuition is roughly the following: whatever the pricing policies
adopted by the firms, firm i distorts the qualities of its product in order to ensure that
consumers who value much the product of the rival firm j still buy its own product;
the same reasoning holds for firm j. Remember now that each firm is informed on the
consumers’ valuations for its own product; hence, for some consumers types, firm i does not
distort much the quality offered whereas firm j distorts a lot its own quality; since qualities
are substitutes from the consumers’ viewpoint, a feed-back effect arises at equilibrium:
firm i sometimes over-supplies quality whereas firm j under-supplies it with respect to the
complete information situation.
Under intrinsic common agency, the results are more surprising. Roughly speaking, in
that context the participation constraint of the consumer from the perspective of firm i
still depends on the price offered by firm j (this is not the case under delegated common
agency). Hence, the ranking of the various consumers from firm i’s viewpoint is directly
affected by the firm j’s offer since firm j knows the information unknown to firm i. We
argue in the paper that the ranking of the consumers types becomes endogenous in this
context and show that there exists two equilibria with the following feature: in each equi-
librium, consumers’ rent are increasing in their valuation for one brand, and decreasing in
their valuation for the other brand! (the two equilibria differ in that brands are permuted).
This means that in each of these equilibria, the consumer with the highest valuation for,
say brand A, and the lowest valuation for, say Brand B, gets the highest rent while the
consumer with reverse features gets the lowest rent. Hence, our model suggests that brand
loyalty is not beneficial for all consumers8.
The paper is organized as follows. We first briefly relate our work to the literature.
Section 2, introduces the building blocks of the model, and briefly present the complete
information benchmark. The partially-discriminatory and fully-discriminatory equilibria
are derived in Sections 3 and 4 respectively. In Section 5, we compare the two pricing
policies for a particular specification of the model. Section 6 concludes.
Related literature. Our paper is related to the recent work on competition in nonlin-
ear pricing with multidimensional heterogeneity, e.g., Ivaldi and Martimort (1994), Stole
(1995), Schmidt-Mohr and Villas-Boas (1999), Armstrong and Vickers (1999), and Rochet
and Stole (2002). In the first two papers, although heterogeneity is two-dimensional, the
adverse selection problem that each firm ultimately faces is uni-dimensional, as in our
framework. The remaining papers do analyze competition in which adverse selection is
purely multidimensional. Armstrong and Vickers (1999), and Rochet and Stole (2002)
show that competition in nonlinear prices may take simple forms; when there is not full
coverage (competition), then each firm acts as a monopoly. Remarkably, under full compe-
tition, all distortions disappear. Our paper belongs to the category of the first two papers,
8In the literature on horizontal differentiation, a high valuation to pay for a brand is usually interpreted
as brand loyalty. Our results suggest that only consumers loyal to one of the two brands will get high
rents. Consumers loyal to the competing brand will get little rent.
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and is most closely related to Ivaldi and Martimort (1994), whose framework we use. They
find empirical evidence of nonlinear pricing in the French Energy market. The patterns
or rents (decreasing) and (upward) quality distortions that we obtain in our paper do not
occur in the works cited above. An exception is Bond and Gresik (1997) who analyze
a tax competition game using a (uni-dimensional) intrinsic common agency framework
with asymmetrically informed principals. They also obtain that the rent of the agent may
decrease in its cost efficiency parameter. While in their paper, this phenomena may not
occur (as it is one of three possible equilibria), it occurs in all equilibria of our intrinsic
common agency game.
Our result that the PDP dominates the FDP (which we obtain under delegated com-
mon agency) also contributes to the the literature on the welfare effects of uniform vs.
discriminatory pricing (see, e.g., Thisse and Vives, 1988, Holmes, 1989, and Corts, 1998,
among others), which is extensively surveyed in Stole (2003). One of the main findings of
this literature is that duoplists may prefer uniform pricing to (third degree) price discrim-
ination. We add to that literature a new comparison which incorporates different forms
of price discrimination simultaneously.
2 The Model
Consider a duopoly in which two firms (i = 1, 2) sell one unit of variable quality products
to a continuum of buyers.9 The gross utility of a given consumer, who consumes quality
q1 of good 1 and quality q2 of good 2, is (superscript ‘g’ stands for ‘gross’)
Ug(θ, q1, q2) ≡ u1(θ1, q1) + u2(θ2, q2) + u(q1, q2), (1)
where θ ≡ (θ1, θ2). Parameter θi relates to the consumer’s intrinsic valuation for the
quality of good i; that θi is (a priori) different from θj simply translates the fact that,
for equal products’ qualities, some consumers inherently have a stronger preference for
one good. However, the buyers’ utility derived from the consumption of the products
also depends on the attributes attached to the different goods, which is embodied in the
quality levels. Products are assumed to be imperfect substitutes, i.e., Ugq1q2 = uq1q2 ≤ 0,
for all quality levels: provided that a consumer buys both goods, a marginal increase in
the quality of one product reduces the marginal valuation for the other good.
The following assumptions are assumed to hold for all strictly positive consumption
levels: Ugqi > 0, U
g
qiqi < 0, U
g
θi
> 0, Ugθiqi > 0. These conditions are interpreted as follows:
for each good, marginal utility increases with quality, but at a decreasing rate; the stronger
the preference for good i is, the higher are the consumer’s utility and marginal utility levels.
For tractability, we also assume that ui(θi, 0) = 0, Ug(θ, 0, 0) = 0 and |Ugqiqi | ≥ |Ugqiqj |.10
It is common knowledge that θi is independently distributed on the interval Θi ≡ [θi, θi]
9Following Maskin and Riley (1984), another interpretation is that the consumers buy a variable quan-
tity of the various goods.
10That ui(θi, 0) = U
g(0, 0) = 0 is assumed for analytical convenience only and does not affect our
results as long as ui(θi, 0) and U
g(θ, 0, 0) do not depend neither on θi nor on θj ; the last condition, namely
|Ugqiqi | ≥ |Ugqiqj |, is standard and implies that, were firms offering purely linear prices, a consumer’s demand
function for one good would be more sensitive to the price of that good than to the rival price.
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according to the (strictly positive) density fi(.) with c.d.f. Fi(.), i = 1, 2.11 However, only
a consumer perfectly knows his valuation for both goods. As regards firms, we assume
they are asymmetrically un-informed as defined next.
Definition 1. Asymmetrically un-informed duopolists: firm i is perfectly informed about
θi but only knows the distribution of θj, i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2.
This information structure underlines the fundamental asymmetry between competitors:
each firm is better informed on the consumers’ marginal valuations for its product than
on the consumers’ valuations for the rival product.
Firm i’s profit is defined as follows
Vi = pi − Ci(qi),
where Ci(qi) is the strictly increasing and convex cost of producing good i with quality
level qi and pi is the price paid by the consumer to firm i.
A consumer’s net utility is the difference between his gross utility and the prices paid
to the firms,12 or
U = −p1 − p2 + Ug(θ, q1, q2).
Throughout the paper, we shall focus on a given consumer.
The timing goes as follows: first, firms make simultaneously and non-cooperatively
their offers; second, consumers decide which offers they accept. As argued in the Intro-
duction, two cases are worth considering:13
• Intrinsic common agency. In that case, the consumer attributes no value to product
i without the purchase of good j. Therefore, to ascertain that the consumer will
purchase its good, firm i must ensure that the consumer’s utility when he accepts
both firms’ offers is larger that his utility if he decides to purchase none (which is
normalized to 0), or
U ≥ 0. (PCIi )
• Delegated common agency. In that setting, the consumer has the extra option to
decide buying only one product. Therefore, from the perspective of firm i the par-
ticipation constraint becomes
U ≥ max{0;Uouti (θ)} , (PCDi )
where Uouti (θ) is the consumer’s outside opportunity with respect to firm i: this
represents the consumer’s rent when he decides to buy only from the rival firm j.
Notice that this outside opportunity is endogenous since it depends on the rival
firm’s offer.
11Notice that considering imperfectly correlated adverse selection parameters would not qualitatively
change the main messages conveyed in this paper since this would only modify each firm’s prior on the
unknown piece of information.
12If qi = 0 then the price paid by the consumer to firm i is null.
13The cases correspond to the intrinsic and delegated common agency settings, as coined by Bernheim
and Whinston (1986).
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Benchmark. As a useful benchmark, let us briefly analyze the case in which both firms
perfectly know both consumer’s preferences, i.e., θ1 and θ2. For future references, we
refer to this case as the complete information case. In this case, each firm can perfectly
discriminate the different types of consumers. Under complete information, firm i can
restrict his offer to a pair {qi(θ), pi(θ)}.14




s.t. (PCIi ) : U(θ) = U
g(θ, q1(θ), q2(θ))− p1(θ)− p2(θ) ≥ 0.
The participation constraint must bind at equilibrium since firm i seeks to set as high a
price as possible; this defines the value of the optimal price set by firm i:
pi(θ) = Ug(θ, q1(θ), q2(θ))− pj(θ).
Substituting pi(θ) in the objective of firm i and optimizing with respect to qi(θ) yields the
following first-order condition (which is necessary and sufficient in our context):
Ugqi(θ, q
FB
i (θ), qj(θ)) = Ciqi(q
FB
i (θ)) i 6= j i, j = 1, 2. (2)
Equation (2) is a usual ‘marginal benefit equals marginal cost’ rule from firm i’s per-
spective, which accounts for firm j non-cooperative offer. Solving the system formed by
the two best-responses yield the complete information equilibrium qualities offered by the
firms. It is worth mentioning that only the sum of the prices p1(θ) + p2(θ) is defined in
equilibrium of the intrinsic common agency game, implying that the way firms share the
consumer’ surplus is not defined at equilibrium.
Considering (2) evaluated for the equilibrium qualities and differentiating w.r.t. θi
and θj , we obtain that
∂qFBi
∂θi
(θ) ≥ 0 and ∂qFBi∂θj (θ) ≤ 0, for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. Intuitions are
straightforward. First, the lower the consumer’s valuation θi for the quality of the good
produced by firm i is, the lower is firm i’s equilibrium quality level. Second, applying a
similar argument, the smaller θj is, the smaller is quality qj ; such a decrease in qj leads to
an increase in qi since the marginal utility of the consumer for firm i’s good is increased.
Consider now the case of delegated common agency. With respect to the previous case,
the unique difference is that the participation constraint becomes:
U(θ) = Ug(θ, qi(θ), qj(θ))−pi(θ)−pj(θ) ≥ max
{
0;Uouti (θ) = U
g(θ, qi = 0, qj(θ))− pj(θ)
}
.
In words, from the perspective of firm i, it must ensure that the consumer is better off
accepting both firm’s offers rather than consuming exclusively the rival firm’s good.15
14In common agency games under adverse selection, firms are typically assumed to compete in nonlinear
prices; see Martimort and Stole (2002) for a complete analysis of the role of the space of contracts in these
games. In our context, under complete information, one can show that there is no loss of generality in
restricting attention to direct contracts, i.e. to price-quality pairs based on the consumer’s information.
15Implicit in this formulation of the outside opportunity gain for the consumer is that a firm’s offer cannot
be contingent on the consumer’s decision to buy only the rival product. Such a contracting possibility is
likely to violate antitrust rules and is therefore discarded from our analysis.
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Later on, we shall spend time understanding the impact of the outside opportunity on
the competition between firms. At this stage, we simply want to emphasize the following
point: under complete information, if the outside opportunity is strictly positive then
equilibrium quality levels are left unaffected. Indeed, suppose that Uouti (θ) is positive;
as previously, firm i will set the highest price consistent with the consumer buying its
product, or
pi(θ) = Ug(θ, qi(θ), qj(θ))− Ug(θ, qi = 0, qj(θ)).
Putting this expression in firm i’s objective, one can see that the quality chosen by firm
i is the same as the one under intrinsic common agency: under complete information,
the possibility for the consumer to shop exclusively with one of the competitors does not
affect the equilibrium quality choices and only modifies the consumer’s equilibrium rent.16
The intuition is immediate: under full information, each firm perfectly (first-degree) dis-
criminates the consumer, but might be constrained, in terms of surplus given up to the
consumer (the outside opportunity), by its competitors. Under complete information on
the firms’ side, the competitive pressure which is channeled through the buyer’s outside
opportunities only leads to a reallocation of the total surplus between the consumer and
the firms. Note that unlike in the intrinsic common agency case, firm i’s price is now
uniquely defined. Loosely speaking, the outside opportunity of the consumer with respect
to firm i determines the latter’s bargaining power in sharing the surplus with the other
firm.
Remark. Note that the outcomes obtained in the previous benchmark would have been
obtained had we assumed that both firms act cooperatively (multiproduct monopoly).
Hence, for later comparison, the complete information benchmark also refers to the per-
fectly discriminating monopoly or the first-best from the viewpoint of firms.
3 Competition in Partially-Discriminatory Pricing
We are first going to analyze the case of competition in which firms price uniformly
along the unknown dimension of heterogeneity. Under Partially-Discriminatory Pricing
(hereafter PDP), firm i being informed about the consumer’s valuation for its own product,
its offer to the consumer still depends on this piece of information. Hence, the firms’ pricing
policy consists in a mix of first-degree price discrimination along the known dimension of
the consumer’s preference and uniform pricing along the unknown dimension: firms only
partially discriminate the different types of buyer. This competition in uniform pricing
allows to highlight many of the specificities of the interaction between asymmetrically
un-informed firms.
Delegated common agency. Firm i offers a price-quality pair which depends only on
the known information, {pi(θi), qi(θi)},17 in order to maximize its expected profit while
16In common agency models with symmetrically uninformed principals, this result also holds under
incomplete information. As we shall see later, this results breaks down in our model when principals’
information is incomplete and asymmetric.
17In a sense, firm i’s offer consists in a price schedule which is degenerated to a single point.
8
ensuring that the buyer does not shop exclusively with its rival, or
max
{qi(θi),pi(θi)}
Eθj {pi(θi)− Ci (qi(θi))}
s.t. (PCDi ) : ∀θj ∈ Θj , U(θi, θj) ≥ max
{
0;Uouti (θj) = −pj(θj) + Ug(θj , qi = 0, qj(θj))
}
.
First, we need to check whether the consumer’s ‘threat’ to shop exclusively with the
rival firm is credible, i.e., whether outside opportunities are positive when firms compete
in partially-discriminatory pricing policies. The following result is obtained.
Lemma 1. When goods are substitutes and firms compete in partially-discriminatory pric-
ing policies, both outside opportunities are positive.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The intuition is straightforward. Consider the extreme scenario in which qualities are
highly substitutable. In that case, if the consumer decides not to acquire product i, then
his loss of utility can be almost fully offset by increasing the level of quality chosen for good
j; differently stated, the consumer can threaten firm i to shop exclusively with its rival
and derive a strictly positive utility level. Lemma 1 shows that this reasoning holds even
when products are weakly substitutable and firms adopt partially-discriminatory pricing
strategies.
In our setting with asymmetrically informed firms, the main difficulty that arises in
solving firm i’s problem stems from the fact that, a priori, firm j’s offer to the consumer
depends on firm i’s unknown information, θj . As we argue next, this implies that the
behavior of the consumer’s rent requires to be studied with particular attention. To high-
light this point, we split the firms’ optimization problem into two sub-problems: first, we
study the duopolists’ best-responses assuming that the buyer’s rent behaves monotonically
w.r.t. the adverse selection parameters; second, we focus on the variation of the buyer’s
rent w.r.t. the private information parameters.
Best-responses for given indifferent types. Given Lemma 1, a relevant variable in our
context is the difference between the rent U(θ) and the outside opportunity Uouti (θj) that
we call the ‘net rent’. The main issue here is to determine how the net rent of the consumer
in relation to a given firm varies with respect to the information unknown by this firm.
Assume in a first time that ∂∂θj [U(θ)− Uouti (θj)] has a constant sign.18 This implies that,
from firm i’s viewpoint, there exists a type θ∗j ∈ {θj , θj} of buyer, called the indifferent
type for firm i, such that if the participation constraint is satisfied for this type, then it
is satisfied for all the other types of buyer. Since firm i dislikes giving up excessive rent
to the buyer, it will offer the price pi(θi) such that the individual rationality constraint
binds at equilibrium for θj = θ∗j , that is,
Ug(θi, θ∗j , qi(θi), qj(θ
∗
j ))− pi(θi)− pj(θ∗j ) = −pj(θ∗j ) + Ug(θi, θ∗j , qi = 0, qj(θ∗j )), (3)
18This property is satisfied at equilibrium.
9
or equivalently,
pi(θi) = Ug(θi, θ∗j , qi(θi), qj(θ
∗
j ))− Ug(θi, θ∗j , qi = 0, qj(θ∗j )). (4)
Two points are worth highlighting: first, since we consider participation of all the different
types of consumers, everything happens as if firm i was considering that the buyer is of
type θ∗j ; second, the price offered by firm i is uniquely defined by the binding participation
constraint.




j , qi(θi), qj(θ
∗
j )) = Ciqi(qi(θi)). (5)
We can perform similar computations for firm j and obtain the following condition
Ugqj (θ
∗
i , θj , qi(θ
∗
i ), qj(θj)) = Cjqj (qj(θj)). (6)
Considering (5) evaluated in θi = θ∗i and (6) in evaluated in θj = θ
∗
j forms a system of
two equations, whose solution determines qi(θ∗i ) and qj(θ
∗
j ). Then, plugging back qi(θ
∗
i )
and qj(θ∗j ) in (5) and (6) respectively, and solving this new system yields the quality
profiles qi(θi) and qj(θj) in the PDP equilibrium. We note that total differentiation of (5)





The indifferent types. It remains to determine θ∗i and θ
∗
j . To this purpose and to build the
intuition, let us introduce the ‘net prices’ defined as follows: p˜i(θi) ≡ pi(θi)−ui(θi, qi(θi)),
i = 1, 2. Since firm i is perfectly informed on the buyer’s valuation for its product, the
part ui(θi, qi(θi)) of the gross utility is perfectly observed by that firm and hence cannot
be a source of rent for the consumer. This is the basic motivation to focus on net prices.
With this new notation, the consumer’s rent is
U(θ) = −p˜i(θi)− p˜j(θj) + u(qi(θi), qj(θj)),
while his outside opportunity becomes
Uouti (θj) = −p˜j(θj) + u(0, qj(θj)).
The net rent can hence be rewritten as





19The associated second-order condition is satisfied under our assumptions.
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uqiqj (x, qj(θj))dx ≤ 0. (7)
Hence, the price-quantity couple offered by firm i is such that the consumer’s net rent
is decreasing in the adverse selection parameter θj , and symmetrically for firm j. To see
this from a different perspective, consider a hypothetical marginal increase dθj > 0 in the
consumer’s valuation for good j; this increase has two effects:
• Firstly, the consumer is led to pay a larger net price to firm j. Indeed, using the
equivalent of (4) for firm j, we get
pj(θj) = ui(θ∗i , qi(θ
∗
i ))+uj(θj , qj(θj))+u(qi(θ
∗
i ), qj(θj))−ui(θ∗i , qi(θ∗i ))−u(qi(θ∗i ), 0).
Hence, the equilibrium net price is defined by p˜j(θj) = u(qi(θ∗i ), qj(θj))−u(qi(θ∗i ), 0);





0. Note that this increase affects in a similar way the consumer’s rent and the outside
opportunity, so that this effect is neutral for the net rent.
• Secondly, this increase also affects the part of the buyer’s rent which cannot be fully
captured by the firm; this in turn impacts differently the consumer’s rent and his
outside opportunity since the former increases by uqj (qi(θi), qj(θj))q
′
j(θj)dθj whereas
the latter increases by uqj (0, qj(θj))q
′
j(θj)dθj ; since products are substitutes for the
consumer, the former increase is weaker than the latter, thereby implying that the
net rent is decreasing in θj .
An implication of (7) is that, for firm i, the indifferent type is θ∗i = θi; using symmetry
we obtain θ∗j = θj . Another implication of (7) is that, at equilibrium, the consumer’s rent
can be expressed as follows






−uqiqj (x, qj(z))dxdz. (8)
Equation (8) illustrates that the consumer derives utility from two distinct sources. The
first one is incomplete information on the firms’ side, which prevents competitors from
fully extracting the consumer’ surplus. The second one stems from the implicit threat put
by the consumer on each of the non-cooperating firms to shop exclusively with the rival
firm. Firm i provides the consumer with the highest valuation for the rival good (i.e., θj)
with a utility level equal to his outside opportunity; consumers with lower valuations for
good j earn more than their outside opportunities. However, the θj-consumer gets more
rent than consumers with lower valuation. Indeed, we have
∂U
∂θj




−uqiqj (x, qj(θj))dx ≥ 0,
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meaning that the larger the consumer’s valuation for the rival (say firm j)’s product, the
larger the consumer’s rent given up by firm i at equilibrium. An intuition for this result is
the following. In relation to firm i, the θj-consumer has the highest outside opportunity20.
Indeed, if he was an exclusive consumer of firm j, such consumer would have the highest
rent; firm j, uninformed about the private information of the consumer (θj) and pricing
uniformly, would set its unique price in such a way that the high-valuation consumer
gets the highest rent while the low valuation consumer gets no rent. Hence, firm i must
provide the highest rent to the θj-consumer to make him buy its good. Since firm i dislikes
leaving rents, it will set the rent exactly equal to the outside opportunity. Conversely, the
θj has the lowest outside opportunity. Given that, under uniform pricing, the unique price
offered by each firm is set so low (to allow the θj-consumer to get at least his (high) outside
opportunity), this benefits the θj-consumer, who in the end gets a rent higher than its
(low) outside opportunity.
In sum, competition forces each firm to provide higher rents to consumers with higher
valuations for the rival’s product, although they get exactly their outside opportunity,
contrarily to lower valuation buyers who get a smaller rent but larger than their outside
opportunity. It is these two effects, which have not been analyzed by the literature, that
our analysis wishes to emphasize. The profile of rents is illustrated in Figure 1.21
Figure 1: Rent profiles in the PDP equilibrium with the possibility of exclusive shopping.
To complete our analysis of the delegated common agency case, we now focus on the




˜ ≤ 0 and ∂
∂θj
U(θ) ≥ 0 necessarily imply that
∂
∂θj
Uouti (θj) ≥ 0.





pattern of quality levels. The first-order conditions (5) and (6) can be rewritten as follows
Ugqi(θ, qi(θi), qj(θj))− Ciqi(qi(θi)) = −
∫ qj(θj)
qj(θj)
uqiqj (qi(θi), y)dy ≥ 0, (9)
Ugqj (θ, qi(θi), qj(θj))− Cjqj (qj(θj)) = −
∫ qi(θi)
qi(θi)
uqiqj (x, qj(θj))dx ≥ 0. (10)
Equations (9) and (10) implicitly define the firms’ best-responses, denoted by Ri(qj(θi)).
With respect to the complete information benchmark, where the best-responses were such
that marginal utility equals marginal cost for each product, asymmetric information im-
plies that the best-responses curves are shifted downwards. Everything happens here as if
firm i anticipates that the consumer’s valuation for product j is given by θj ; since quality
levels are increasing in the consumer’s valuations, firm i anticipates too high a quality
level purchased by the consumer for product j; products being substitutes, firm i’s qual-
ity level tends to decrease w.r.t. the full information benchmark. However, there is a
feedback effect to consider in order to fully apprehend the equilibrium pattern of quality
levels. Suppose indeed that θj is close enough to θj ; then firm i’s quality level is not much
distorted; suppose simultaneously that θi is close to θi; then firm j’s quality level is much
distorted; since products are substitutes, firm i over-supplies and firm j under-supplies
quality at equilibrium. The pattern of distortion is represented graphically in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Best-responses and the set of quality levels in the PDP equilibrium with the
possibility of exclusive shopping.
Summarizing, we get the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Under delegated common agency, there exists a unique partially-discriminatory
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pricing equilibrium, with indifferent types θ∗j = θj and θ
∗
i = θi. The rent of a consumer is
increasing in his valuation for each product, while his net rent is decreasing. With respect
to the first-best case, there is either over-supply of quality for one good and under-supply
of quality for the other good, or under-supply of quality for both goods. Only the indifferent
types get the first-best qualities.
Intrinsic common agency. In this setting competition is less severe since the con-
sumer’s outside opportunities are now null. How is the analysis affected?
As previously, consider firm i and assume that the consumer’s rent behaves mono-
tonically with respect to θj . Then, we can define the indifferent type θ∗j such that the
participation constraint is exactly binding, or
U(θi, θ∗j ) = −p˜i(θi)− p˜j(θ∗j ) + u(qi(θi), qj(θ∗j )) = 0.
It is immediate that the first-order condition that characterizes firm i’s optimal quality
level is still given by (5). The reason is that the previous case (delegated common agency)
differs from the current situation only in the outside opportunity, which was independent
of qi in the delegated common agency case. Therefore, if the indifferent types under
intrinsic common agency are the same as under delegated agency, then both settings will
yield the same quality levels and will differ only in the allocation of total surplus between
the consumers and the firms. As we shall soon see, the indifferent types are different in
the current setting, which yields different equilibria from those obtained under delegated
common agency.
Remember that, using net prices introduced earlier, the consumer’s rent could be
expressed as
U(θ) = −p˜i(θi)− p˜j(θj) + u(qi(θi), qj(θj))
Taking the partial derivative with respect to θj yields
∂
∂θj
U(θ) = −p˜′j(θj) + uqj (qi(θi), qj(θj))q′j(θj),
which can no longer be signed a priori: firm i’s ranking over the different (unknown) types
of consumer is endogenous as it depends now directly on firm j’s offer to the consumer.
We now determine the indifferent types. Suppose that firm i expects firm j’s offer to be
such that consumer with larger valuations for product j earn smaller rents, or ∂∂θjU(θ) ≤ 0.
Firm i’s offer is then such that p˜i(θi) = −p˜j(θj) + u(qi(θi), qj(θj)). The consumer’s rent
is then equal to




[p˜jθj (z)− uqj (qi(θi), qj(x))q′j(x)]dx.
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which is positive. We have therefore proven that if the indifferent type for firm i is θj , then
the indifferent type for firm j is θi. In a similar way, it can be proven that if the indifferent
type for firm i is θj , then the indifferent type for firm j is θi. Therefore, the indifferent
types are either {θi, θj} or {θi, θj}: multiple equilibria emerge, each equilibrium leading to
rent and quality levels which differ from those obtained in the delegated common agency
setting.
As in any model of competition, the contractual offer proposed by one competitor
to the consumer affects the behavior of the latter in its relationship with the rival firm.
With asymmetrically informed firms, there is an additional effect though. Indeed, each
firm being informed on the piece of information unknown to its rival, the offer of, say,
firm i will also affect how firm j ranks the different types of buyer: the relevant unknown
information for firm j is not only θi but also the information transmitted in firm’s proposal.
Preferences of the consumer for the quality of the various products become endogenous.
This is best observed in the intrinsic common agency setting in which only the sum of prices
is defined at equilibrium; in that case, if firm j offers a contract such that consumers with
larger valuations for its product earns larger rents, then firm i offers in turn a contract with
the reverse property, namely that consumers with larger inherent valuations for product
i obtain smaller rent. Under delegated common agency, the participation constraints pin
down uniquely the prices offered by the firms, leading to a unique equilibrium; in that
case, the need to prevent exclusive shopping forces a given firm to give up larger rents to
consumers with larger valuations for its product.
We conclude this case with an analysis of the equilibrium quality levels. Adapting
the previous analysis, we observe that best-responses are shifted in opposite directions:
at equilibrium, there is now over-supply of quality for one good and under-supply for the
other product. The equilibrium quality levels and rent profiles in that case are represented
in Figure 3 and Figure 4 respectively.
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Figure 3: Best-responses and the set of quality levels in the PDP equilibrium without the
possibility of exclusive shopping (indifferent types {θi, θj}).
Figure 4: Rent profiles in the PDP equilibrium without the possibility of exclusive shopping
(indifferent types {θi, θj}).
Summarizing, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Under intrinsic common agency, there exist two symmetric partially-
discriminating equilibria: one with indifferent types {θi, θj}, the other with indifferent
types {θi, θj}. In both equilibria:
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(i) the consumer’s rent is increasing in the valuation for one good and decreasing in the
valuation for the other good.
(ii) with respect to the first best, there is over-supply of quality for one good and under-
supply for the other; only the indifferent types get the first-best qualities.
In these equilibria, consumers who are loyal to a brand, that is, those who value
much more one brand than the other, earn either the largest rents, or the smallest rents
depending on which brand they fancy. Indifferent consumers, that is those who equally
like both brands are the only ones whose rent do not vary across the two equilibria Hence,
brand loyalty does not pay off for all consumers. Only consumers who are loyal to one of
the brands get the highest rent22. We discuss these features more extensively in the next
section.
Consumers participation: From Common to Exclusive Agency. So far, we as-
sumed implicitly that firms serve all consumers, i.e., there is full participation at equi-
librium since for all types, the equilibrium rent is larger than the corresponding outside
opportunities. However, one could find circumstances under which a firm prefers not to
serve some potential customers in order to extract more surplus from the remaining par-
ticipating consumers. In terms of our model, in the delegated common agency case, this
would mean that firm i sets θ∗j < θj .
From firm i’s perspective, the more ‘costly’ consumers are those who have large val-
uations for the rival firm’s good since firm i must give them up sufficiently large rents
to ensure that they will not shop exclusively with the rival. High-valuations customers
who put too strong an implicit threat on both firms end up consuming only their most
preferred good only: for those consumers, U(θ1, θ2) ≤ Uouti (θj) for i, j = 1, 2 and they
choose brand i iff Uoutj (θi) ≥ Uouti (θj).
Figure 5 illustrates the consumers’ choices under delegated common agency when both
firms non-cooperatively adopt such a strategy.23
22Our result support a popular wisdom, which believes that it is sometimes good to buy from the rival
even when his brand is less appreciated. This is supposed to maintain a pressure on the firms, who may
otherwise “abuse” consumers’ loyalty.
23Whether it is optimal requires to put more structure on the model (in particular on the utility function











q1 > q2 = 0
q2 > q1 = 0q1, q2 > 0
θ∗2
θ∗1
Figure 5: Participation decisions when consumers have the possibility of exclusive shopping
(delegated common agency).
It is worth noting that our model can therefore easily accommodate situations in which
some consumers buy both goods (as in the common agency framework) whereas others
decide to buy only one of the available brand (as in an exclusive agency framework).
Notice that the pattern of consumers’ decisions depends again importantly on the
possibility to shop exclusively with one firm or not. Indeed, had we considered the intrinsic








q1 = q2 = 0q1, q2 > 0
q1 = q2 = 0q1 = q2 = 0
θ∗2
θ∗1
Figure 6: Participation decisions when consumers must buy both products (intrinsic common
agency).
4 Competition in Fully-Discriminatory Pricing
As regards the previous section, one may object that firms might try to better tailor
their offers to the different characteristics of the consumers. We now address this issue
by analyzing competition in nonlinear prices. Under incomplete information, firm i can
achieve such a second-degree price discrimination by facing the consumer with a price
schedule pi(θi, qi), defined for all positive qi, such that different types of a consumer choose
different quality levels. In that context, the firms’ pricing policy consists in a mix of first-
degree price discrimination along the known dimension of heterogeneity and second-degree
price discrimination along the unknown dimension of the consumer’s preference: firms fully
discriminate the different types of buyers.
For a given price schedule offered by firm j, there is no loss of generality in applying
the Revelation Principle24 to determine firm i’s optimal price and quality levels. How-
ever, the consumer’s behavior and therefore his incentive vis-a`-vis firm i depend on the
price schedule offered by the rival firm j. Hence, we define Uˆi(θj , qi) the indirect utility
function which gives the maximal gain of the consumer with type θ = (θi, θj) for a given
consumption level qi when that buyer chooses optimally his the quality level for product
j as follows25
Uˆi(θ, qi) = max
qj
{−pj(θj , qj) + Ug(θ, qi, qj)} ,
qˆj(θ, qi) = argmax
qj
{−pj(θj , qj) + Ug(θ, qi, qj)} .
24See Green and Laffont (1977) or Myerson (1981) for instance.
25See Martimort and Stole (2002) for the detailed methodology.
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qˆj(θ, qi) highlights the linkage between the consumer’s choices of qualities: a change in
the quality of one good affects the consumer’s marginal utility for the other good. When
designing its offer for the consumer, each firm accounts for the impact of its rival’s offer on
the choice of quality levels by the consumer. We assume that qˆj(θj , qi) is defined through
the following first-order condition as follows26
−Pjqj (θj , qˆj) + Ugqj (θ, qi, qˆj) = 0. (11)





−pi(θi, qi) + Uˆi(θj , qi)
}
.
We can now apply the standard methodology27 to find the conditions for (local) incentive
compatibility from the viewpoint of firm i. These conditions are, as usual, expressed in






(θj , qi(θ)) = −Pjθj (θj , qˆj) + Ugθj (θj , qˆj), (FOICi)
∂2Uˆi
∂qi∂θj
(θj , qi(θ))× ∂qi
∂θj
(θ) ≥ 0. (SOICi)
From (FOICi), we observe that firm i can obtain the revelation of the unknown infor-
mation only in an indirect way: the quality of its product qi does not affect directly the
buyer’s rent. As in the partially-discriminatory pricing case, (FOICi) also shows that
one cannot sign a priori the derivative of the consumer’s rent w.r.t. to firm i’s unknown
information θj since this derivative depends on the endogenous price schedule offered by
firm j.
The Spence-Mirrlees condition is now endogenous and must be assumed to ensure
that the problem remains well-behaved: ∀(θj , qi), ∂2Uˆi∂qi∂θj (θj , qi) < 0. Provided that this
condition is satisfied, local incentive compatibility of an allocation ensures that it is also
globally incentive compatible and the local second-order condition for incentive compati-
bility reduces to a standard monotonicity constraint on the quality profile of good i.
If the consumer decides to buy only the rival’s product, then the corresponding quality
and rent are given by
Uouti (θj) = maxqj
{−pj(θj , qj) + Ug(θ, qi = 0, qj)} = qˆj(θ, 0),
qoutj (θj) = argmaxqj
{−pj(θj , qj) + Ug(θ, qi = 0, qj)} = Uˆj(θ, 0).
The next lemma turns out to be useful.
Lemma 2. When qualities are substitutes and firms compete in price schedules, both
outside opportunities are positive.
Proof. See Ivaldi and Martimort (1994).
26This requires to check that the consumer’s program is concave at equilibrium.
27See, e.g., Guesnerie and Laffont (1984).
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The intuition is similar to the one underlying Lemma 1.
We now show that the indifferent types are the same in the FDP and the PDP equi-
libria; this, however, implies different kinds of distortions of the quality profiles.
Equilibrium quality profiles given the indifferent types. Consider that the rent profile is
strictly monotonic in the adverse selection parameters. Then, from the viewpoint of firm i
there exists an indifferent type θ∗j ∈ {θi, θi} such that the participation constraint is
binding, or




j ) under delegated common agency,
0 under intrinsic common agency.
Denote by θ˜j the boundary of Θj different from θ∗j . For further references, we note that















(y, qi(θi, y))dy under intrinsic common agency.
Leaving aside the second-order condition for incentive compatibility, the Hamiltonian
associated to firm i’s maximization problem is
Hi = fj(θj)
{






where µj(θj) is the co-state variable. Since there is no transversality condition in θj = θ˜j ,
we have µj(θ˜j) = 0. The Maximum Principle implies that −∂Hi∂U = µ˙j(θj). Therefore, we
obtain that µj(θj) =
∫ θj
θ˜j
fj(x)dx. Then, optimizing w.r.t. the control variable leads to
(this requires that the Hamiltonian be concave in qi)







(θj , qi(θ)). (12)
At equilibrium we must have qj(θ) = qˆj(θ, qi(θ)). Hence, (11) becomes
−Pjqj (θj , qj(θ)) + Ugqj (θ, qi(θ), qj(θ)) = 0. (13)
Equation (13) can be differentiated w.r.t. θi and θj to further simplify (12); straightforward
manipulations yield















Equilibrium quality profiles are characterized by a set of nonlinear partial differential
equations. Unfortunately, we were not able to study the behavior of the optimal quality
profiles in this general context; this, in turns, prevents from showing that the necessary
21
conditions stated previously are also sufficient.28
As in the PDP equilibrium case, we show next that the nature of the distortions on
the best-responses, and hence on the equilibrium quality profiles, created by asymmetric
information strongly depends on the indifferent types.
The indifferent types under delegated common agency. Remember that the buyer’s outside
opportunity w.r.t. firm i is defined by Uouti (θj) ≡ maxqj {−pj(θj , qj) + Ug(θ, 0, qj)} =











(θj , x)dx < 0.
This implies that the indifferent types are {θi, θj}, as in the PDP equilibrium. As a
consequence, (12) shows that firm i tends to reduce its quality for a given quality offered
by firm j; at equilibrium, as in the PDP equilibrium, there could be either under-provision
of quality for both firms, or under-provision for one firm and over-provision for the other.
The indifferent types under intrinsic common agency. Using the corresponding writing of
the firm’s rent, it is immediate to show that if ∂U∂θj (θ) > 0 then it must be the case that
∂U
∂θi
(θ) < 0: the indifferent types are either {θi, θj} or {θi, θj}. Consequently, (12) shows
that at equilibrium one firm over-provides and the other one under-provides quality.
Discussion. As shown in the previous analysis, the indifferent types in the FDP equilibria
are the same as the indifferent types in the corresponding PDP equilibria. The best-
responses in a FDP equilibrium are therefore shifted in the same direction than in the
corresponding PDP equilibrium. However, in terms of the distortions that arise at equi-
librium, there is a difference between the fully-discriminatory and partially-discriminatory
pricing cases. Indeed, in a FDP equilibrium, there is no distortion on the quality levels for
a consumer with type (θ˜i, θ˜j), whereas in the PDP equilibrium, there is no distortion on
the quality levels for a consumer with type (θ∗i , θ
∗
j ). Consequently, the pattern of distor-
tions on the equilibrium quality levels in the FDP case is ‘opposite’ to the one obtained
in the PDP case. To illustrate this point, let us consider two examples in the delegated
common agency case:
• Buyers with large valuations for both goods. When θi and θj are high, then, as regards
the full information benchmark, there will be weak distortions on the quality levels in
the PDP case, but large downward distortions in the FDP case. A reverse conclusion
in the case the buyer has low valuations for both products.
• Buyers with a large valuation for one product and a low valuation for the other good.
Consider for instance that θi is low and θj is large. In the PDP equilibrium, the
quality of good i is distorted upwards whereas the quality of product j is distorted
downwards; in the corresponding FDP equilibrium, the reverse holds.
28Indeed, we have to show that (i) the firms’ problem are concave, (ii) the consumer’s problem
max{q1,q2}{−p1 − p2 + Ug} is concave so that (11) is valid, (iii) that the Spence-Mirrlees condition is
met at equilibrium and (iv) that the second-order condition for incentive compatibility is also satisfied
at equilibrium. In Section 5, we study a quadratic-uniform specification of our model in which all these
conditions are indeed satisfied at equilibrium.
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Summarizing, we get
Proposition 3. Under fully discriminatory pricing, the indifferent types are the same as
under partially discriminatory pricing. This, however, does not hold for quality distortions;
under FDP, “no distortion” occurs only for the type at the opposite bound of the indifferent
type. Hence, the pattern of distortions is ‘opposite’ to the ones obtained under PDP.
Now we shall try to explain certain market features. Indeed, our results under intrinsic
common agency may help to explain apparently ‘odd’ features in the market for software
viewers. Recall (from the introduction) the example from Martimort and Stole (2003b)
about hardware and software, which perfectly fits the setting of common agency with
substitute goods. Our asymmetric equilibria under intrinsic common agency seem to be
descriptive of these markets. In the computer markets, firms price discriminate by offering
products (the main difference being about the processor) at different prices. The same is
true of the market for softwares, in which firms also price discriminate through different
versions of a software (from basic to one offering many features). Hence, in both markets,
there is price discrimination.
In the market for softwares, producers commonly offer basic versions of their products
for free while more sophisticated versions are highly priced. For instance, Apple offers its
Quick Time Player for free and charges $29.99 for its Quick Time Pro. Real Networks
offers its Real Player for free and charges $49.99 for its Real Player Plus. Hence, high
valuation buyers pay an infinitely higher percentage of the price paid by low valuation
buyers. On the other hand, a DELL desktop computer would feature a price of $599
for a Celeron processor, and $699 for a (faster) Pentium processor;29 in this market, a
high valuation buyer pays only 17 percent of the price paid by the low valuation buyer.
Hence, it seems that, while high valuation buyers of hardware get higher rent than their
low valuation peers, the opposite occurs in the software market.30 This is precisely a
distinctive feature of the equilibria that we obtain under intrinsic common agency.
Shapiro and Varian (1998) have argued that this pricing behavior in the software mar-
ket, which they refer to as ‘versioning’, is intended to avoid competition in a market with
intense competition, high fixed costs and marginal costs close to zero: without versioning,
competition would drive prices to zero, making it impossible for firms to recoup their fixed
costs. There would be nothing to add to Shapiro and Varian’s argument if the market for
software viewers was highly competitive. However, Apple, Real Networks and Microsoft
(with its free Media Player) enjoy some market power (as a matter of fact, versioning
consists in offering different price-version pairs). If it is the case that low-profile users
earn higher rents, then this way of making business by extracting surplus mainly from the
high-profile users would stand in contrast with the standard theory of second-degree price
discrimination. Therefore, we believe that our model might be useful in empirical works
if standard models perform poorly when confronted with the data.
As another example, within the car industry our model may explain the evidence that
price markups are much lower in base models than in models with more options (for more,
29Prices on October 18 2005, for the Dimension 3000 series, at www.dell.com.
30See Wang (2003). Of course, one cannot conclude that this is strictly the case, because consumers’
valuations remain unobservable. However, by giving basic software for free to low-profile buyers, while
charging a high price for a slightly more sophisticated one, it seems more likely, or at least possible, that
the low-profile users are getting more surplus that the high-profile ones.
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see Verboven, 1999). In the same paper, a citation from Louis Philips concludes that
“one has the impression that extra options are overpriced, to extract the highest possible
price from those who want fancy tires or extra horsepower”. Philips seems to suggest that
consumers with preference for the basic models may actually get a higher surplus than
those who prefer the sophisticated versions.
Finally, from a more theory-oriented perspective, Proposition 3 has an important im-
plication for the theory of duopoly competition that uses the common agency framework.
Indeed, in standard common agency models, equilibrium quality allocations are unaf-
fected by the setting (delegated or intrinsic) even under incomplete information.31 In
other words, whether the consumer has the extra option or not to accept one firm’s offer
only does not change the equilibrium quality he consumes; only the distribution of the
rent between consumers and firms is affected. In our model, the fact that competition in
nonlinear prices yields different indifferent types in the intrinsic and the delegated case
implies that:
Corollary 1. With asymmetrically informed firms, equilibrium qualities are affected by
the setting (delegated or intrinsic).
In the next section we compare these equilibria for a particular specification of the
model in which adverse selection parameters are uniformly distributed (thereby neutral-
izing potential bias in the comparison if, say, the joint distribution puts ‘more weight’ on
higher valuations consumers). Under this specification, all the sufficient conditions (for
the consumer’s and the firms’ optimization problems) are satisfied at equilibrium.
5 Comparisons of Pricing Policies
In this section, we put more structure on our model in order to obtain explicit solutions
of the quality profiles in the FDP equilibrium. We use a quadratic specification of the
consumer’s gross utility function
Ug = (a+ θ1)q1 − 12q
2








q2i , i = 1, 2
and the adverse selection parameters are assumed to be uniformly distributed on their
respective support. We restrict attention to the delegated common agency case.
Computing the equilibrium quality and price levels is straightforward in a PDP equi-
librium. However, it becomes more involved in a FDP equilibrium; in that case, we focus
attention on solutions of the nonlinear partial differential equations which are linear in
31This is true as long as full participation is assumed; see Martimort and Stole (2003b).
32See Ivaldi and Martimort (1994) or Miravete and Ro¨ller (2003, 2004) for theoretical and applied
analysis using a similar specification for the utility function.
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the adverse selection parameters. The determination of the price schedules is not inher-
ently difficult but requires to perform cumbersome computations that will not be detailed
here.33
To make sensible comparisons, we compute the expected welfare, firm’s profit and
consumer’s rent, where the expectation is taken over both adverse selection parameters.
Before presenting our results, let us emphasize that the PDP and the FDP equilibrium
perfectly coincide when goods are independent from the consumer’s viewpoint (i.e., when
Ugq1q2 = 0). Indeed, in that case firm i cannot affect the consumer’s incentive to reveal θj
since the choices of qi and qj are independent. Then we obtain the following results.
Result 1. Under delegated common agency,
• from the firms’ viewpoint, partially discriminatory pricing dominates fully discrimi-
natory pricing;
• the consumer’s rent is larger under fully discriminatory pricing than under partially
discriminatory pricing.
Proof. See Web Appendix
To trace out fully the origin of this result, it is worth mentioning that in both equilibria
the profit of each firm (gross of the quality cost) can be decomposed into two parts. The
first (positive) part corresponds to the standard surplus extracted from the consumer
(modulo the information rent given up to that consumer for incentive reason) and the
second (negative) part corresponds to the outside opportunity of consumers which has to
be given up by the firm.
Fully discriminatory pricing enable firms to finely tailor their offers to the character-
istics of the buyer. Hence, discriminatory pricing performs better in extracting surplus
from the different types of consumer. However, discriminatory pricing also triggers an
intense competition between firms, which provides the consumer with higher outside op-
portunities, thereby leading to higher equilibrium rents. As said earlier, the ‘threat’ to
consume only one good is credible and a uniform pricing strategy turns out to be pre-
ferred by firms. Although it may appear at first sight inefficient, the decision not to
tailor offers to all the consumer’s characteristics allows the duopolists to somehow refrain
themselves from competing: Strategic ignorance of consumer’s taste for the rival’s brand
softens competition.
Finally, Result 1 is also in the spirit of those obtained in the literature on price dis-
crimination under complete information (e.g., Thisse and Vives, 1988, Holmes, 1989, and
Corts, 1998, among others). In these papers, uniform pricing may dominate third-degree
price discrimination. Our result extends this argument to settings with both first- and
second-degree price discrimination by arguing that partial discrimination dominates full
discrimination when the consumer can threaten each firm not to consume its good.
Besides, Result 1 has also some empirical implications. Indeed, it argues, first, that
the ‘nature’ of asymmetric information (i.e., whether firms are symmetrically or asymmet-
rically un-informed) is important and should be tested and, second, that attention should
33These computations are available at the following urls: http://center.uvt.nl/staff/diaw/ or http:
//ceco.polytechnique.fr/home/pouyet.
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not be restricted exclusively to nonlinear tariffs since ‘simpler contracts’ might be used by
firms.
For instance, Miravete and Ro¨ller (2003, 2004) consider competition in the cellular
telephone industry; their structural model follows the lines of Ivaldi and Martimort (1994)
and therefore is identical to our model except that firms are un-informed about both private
information parameters; however, they also consider that firms have a priori different
knowledge about the consumer’s characteristics and argue that one possible reason is that
a firm has a better knowledge than its rival about some of the consumer’s characteristics.
Ivaldi and Martimort (1994) focus on the French energy distribution market; analyzing the
data, they argue that asymmetric information is multi-dimensional but that “there is not
too much asymmetric information” (p. 96) and that there is evidence of discrimination
between groups of buyers; moreover, they argue that an energy supplier usually observes
the technology used by a client and therefore might be informed on the client’s willingness-
to-pay for its energy. This suggests that in these contexts it would be relevant to test the
nature of incomplete information.
Moreover, these papers focus mainly on nonlinear price schedules. Our analysis also
suggests that simpler contracts can emerge as a strategic response in a competitive en-
vironment when consumers have the option to shop exclusively with one competitors at
equilibrium. This may explain why fully nonlinear tariffs are seldom observed in practice.34
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a model which allows to explain situations in which
competing firms price-discriminate, yet sometimes provide lower valuations consumers
with higher utility levels. Our model also offers a rich environment that incorporates both
direct and indirect price discrimination and that could serve as a building block for more
applied work.
Some interesting questions have been left aside. For instance, we have assumed that
firms can credibly commit to a partially-discriminatory pricing policy. It would be worth
investigating if firms manage to reach their preferred outcome when they can choose (prior
to the competition stage) either to discriminate or not. In the same vein, if firms are able
to credibly disclose their information to their competitors prior the competition stage, it
would be interesting to study whether they decide to share their information of if some
prisoner’s dilemma occurs at equilibrium.
Recent research in mechanism design has started to examine the impact of informa-
tion sharing between principals. In a setting with one informed and one uninformed
principals, Bond and Gresik (1998) show that the possibility for the informed principal
to communicate his information to the uninformed principal leads to no effective informa-
tion transmission at equilibrium.35 In a sequential common agency context, Calzolari and
34Miravete (2004) considers a monopoly under incomplete information and argues that the firm should
use ‘simple’ mechanisms since the gains to offer fully discriminatory contracts are negligible. Our model
shows that a qualitatively similar result holds in a competitive environment under certain conditions, but
for different reasons.
35More precisely, they show that the most efficient equilibrium when principals can communicate is
equivalent to a pooling equilibrium that emerges in the game with no direct communication between
principals.
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Pavan (2004) study the possibility for the first-mover principal to disclose the informa-
tion learned from contracting with the agent to the last-mover principal and show that,
under certain conditions, information transmission between principals occurs at equilib-
rium. Coming back to our setting of asymmetrically un-informed principals, it would be
worth investigating the possibility for one principal to extract the piece of information
commonly known by the rival principal and the agent through, for instance, ‘Maskinian’
mechanisms.36
These extensions are left for future research.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We adapt the proof of Ivaldi and Martimort (1994) to the PDP equilibrium.
First, consider that both outside opportunities strictly negative at equilibrium. Then
we have−pi(θi)+ui(θi, qi(θi))+u(0, qi(θi)) < 0 for i = 1, 2, implying that−p1(θ1)−p2(θ2)+
u1(θ1, q1(θ1))+u2(θ2, q2(θ2))+u(0, q2(θ2))+u(q1(θ1), 0) < 0. With demand substitutes, the
following inequality holds: u(q1(θ1), 0)+u(0, q2(θ2)) > u(0, 0)+u(q1(θ1), q2(θ2)), implying
in turn that the equilibrium rent of the consumer must be strictly negative, a contradiction.
Second, consider that Uout2 (θ1) > 0. Since the net rent is decreasing in θ1, we have
U(θ1, θ2) = Uout2 (θ1), or p2(θ2) = u2(θ2, q2(θ2)) + u(q1(θ1), q2(θ2)) − u(q1(θ1), 0). Then,




0 uq1q2(x, y)dydx > 0.
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